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Abstract 
This study is a quantitative analysis of Japanese patent information to examine the 
changes in the nature and the outcome of university–industry collaborations (UICs) 
following the enactment of UIC policies in the late 1990s. By considering UIC patents 
not only in joint university–industry patent applications but also in joint inventions 
organized by university personnel and corporate researchers, we discuss the status of 
UICs before the incorporation of national universities. Our analysis indicates that these 
policies increased the number of UIC patents in the late 1990s. However, strong IP 
policies pursued by universities may reduce the incentive for firms to commercialize 
inventions resulting from UIC collaborations. 
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1.   Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer from 
Universities to Private Industry (the “TLO Act”) in 1998, Japan has implemented 
various policy measures to promote university–industry collaboration (UIC). Following 
the incorporation of national universities in 2004, the number of joint research projects 
nearly doubled: from 9,225 (funds received: 21.6 billion yen) in fiscal year (FY) 2003, 
before incorporation, to 17,638 (funds received: 42.0 billion yen) in FY 2009. Patent 
applications by universities increased as well: national universities that underwent 
incorporation witnessed a sharp rise in patent application numbers, from 918 in FY 
2003 to 5,033 in FY 2009. The number of patent applications also increased at private 
universities also increased, suggesting that the series of UIC policies implemented since 
the late 1990s have achieved a certain measure of success (MEXT, 2010). 
With most public research and development (R&D) funds currently earmarked for 
universities and public research organizations, promoting UIC is essential for 
converting this public R&D investment to industrial and economically significant 
innovations. Moreover, through joint research with companies, university faculty can 
gain a deeper understanding of R&D activities within industries that are related to their 
research interests and develop research agendas with concrete goals for innovation, such 
as designing a new product or a new manufacturing process. In turn, faculty exposure to 
industry activities can potentially increase the likelihood of universities and other public 
institutions that conduct R&D activities, leading to industrial innovations.  
However, research activities in universities should not be limited only to the areas that 
leads to direct applications at industry. While universities, public research organizations, 




are generally expected to pursue research in basic areas in which companies are ill-
equipped to address. The role of universities is to open up academic frontiers and 
produce research results with long-lasting and large spillover effects over a wide range 
of disciplines. Stronger university incentive to engage in UICs may affect research, 
giving it a more practical focus and possibly leading to the neglect of basic research, 
which is the natural domain of university research. Some research suggests that 
although the number of patent applications by universities increased in the US 
following the enactment of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980, the quality of the patents 
declined, because excessive focus on commercializing research results led to a neglect 
of basic research, which universities should certainly focus on (Henderson et al., 1998; 
Rosell and Agrawal, 2009). 
Drawing on Japanese patent database, this study provides a quantitative analysis of how 
UICs have changed since UIC policies were introduced in the late 1990s. In doing so, 
we examined not only joint patent applications filed by universities and industry but 
also patents resulting from UICs by tracing the path back to the inventors. This is due to 
the severe restrictions set by the national universities regarding the ownership of 
intellectual property before their incorporation in 2004. In many cases, companies 
ended up filing patent applications alone, even when the results were obtained through 
UIC. In such cases, we can more accurately grasp the status of UIC from patent data if 
we can determine that a university professor or any such individual is named as an 
inventor. We analyze how these UICs changed in nature after the introduction of UIC 
policy measures, what differences resulted from corporate partners of varying sizes, and 
whether the changes led to specific problems. We also compare these differences with 
the traditional process of patent applications by companies alone, even in cases where 




This paper is structured as follows. We begin by discussing the evolution of UIC 
policies in Japan in the next section, providing a historical review of UICs that predate 
the introduction of the US-style UIC system in the late 1990s and examining the 
institutional changes that followed. We then discuss the database used and the 
hypotheses assumed for the analysis. Using the IIP  Patent Database, we identified 
patents for which a joint application was made by universities and industry as well as 
those for joint university–industry inventions for which university personnel and 
corporate researchers were jointly responsible. In Section 4, we discuss the results of 
our analysis and verify the hypotheses formulated in Section 3. Finally, we summarize 
the results of our research to date and discuss policy implications. 
2.  University–industry collaboration policy in Japan 
UICs have been a policy focus in Japan since the late 1990s; however, this partnership 
has a long history. In pre-war Japan, when the main goal was to introduce advanced 
knowledge from foreign countries, UICs and technology transfers from universities 
were undertaken as a normal procedure. During this period, in numerous cases, 
university academicians played an active role in starting businesses, and technology 
transfers often involved the licensing of patents held by university teachers. These cases 
include the establishment of Hakunetsu-sha (current Toshiba) by Ichisuke Fujioka, 
Assistant Professor at Kogakuryo, and the development of Ajinomoto by entrepreneur 
Saburosuke Suzuki, who acquired exclusive rights to a patent on glutamic acid, the 
umami compound of a kombu seaweed broth, for which Tokyo University professor 
Kikunae Ikeda had applied (Baba and Goto, 2007). 
Following the war, the number of UICs declined because of concerns related to the role 




well as student protests against UICs. Even during this period, however, the UIC system 
underwent revisions: The 1961 Act on Research and Development Partnership 
concerning Mining and Manufacturing Technology paved the path for government-led 
joint research by universities, industry, and the government. A contract research system 
with firmswas introduced in national universities in 1970. Moreover, university–
industry relationships were informal at the level of individual faculties such as 
scholarship funding and student employment sponsored by companies (Branscomb et al., 
1999). 
The system of joint research involving universities and the private sector was launched 
in 1983, and marked the beginning of official joint research activities—as opposed to 
contract research—between researchers from industry and academia. Policies 
encouraged the establishment of joint research centers; joint research funding increased 
more than six-fold during the period 1983–1991 along with the number of projects and 
joint patent applications (Yamamoto, 1997).  
At the beginning of the 1990s, Japan introduced a UIC system modeled on the basis of 
that of the US. The foremost driving factor for this change was the belief that high-tech 
areas receiving technology transfers from universities (e.g., IT and biotechnology 
industries) had become the drivers of growth in the US economy, which continued to 
grow in contrast to the Japanese economy, which continued to stagnate from the start of 
the decade. Another significant factor was the renewed recognition of the importance of 
UIC by corporations, as scientific research results obtained by universities began to find 
applications in corporate R&D processes (e.g., in the field of biopharmaceuticals). 
Furthermore, with Chinese and Korean firms rapidly closing the gap created by 
persisting economic weakness in Japan, companies encountered difficulties in 




Technology Basic Law was enacted in 1995. The First Science and Technology Basic 
Plan (1996–2000), which was based on this law, subsequently implemented various 
policies, including the UIC and the promotion of the transfer of research results 
achieved by the state to the private sector. In the context of these policies, attention was 
paid to the method of transferring research results to the private sector through the 
system of technology licensing organizations (TLO) adopted by US universities and 
through the application of US models to Japan, as exemplified in the 1980 Bayh–Dole 
Act.  
Table 1 shows the evolution of the UIC policy in Japan since the late 1990s. The Act on 
the Promotion of Technology Transfer from Universities to Private Industry (the “TLO 
Act”) was enacted in 1998. The policy of promoting TLOs to activate technology 
transfers was spelled out on the basis of this Act, and 47 TLOs approved by MEXT and 
METI were established by 2009. The Act on Special Measures for Industrial 
Revitalization (the “Japanese Bayh–Dole Act”), which was enacted in 1999 and 
modeled on the Bayh–Dole Act enacted in the US in 1980, allowed universities to retain 
title to inventions resulting from state-funded research. In Japan, however, many 
research universities were national universities; therefore, restrictions on retaining rights 
to invention were applied.  As one of state organizations, national university had to 
comply with strict restrictions, applied to the assertion of their rights with regard to 
patent filing. Universities rarely filed patent applications, and in cases where inventing 
was a part of a university research scientist’s academic duties, the rights to inventions 
were generally vested in the individual, i.e., the professor, and not the organization. 
 (Table 1) 




restrictions on technology transfers were relaxed significantly. A mechanism was 
introduced to create competition among universities: University budget were paid in a 
lump sum as an institutional discretionary fund for operating expenses. The total 
amount of the institutional fund was steadily reduced while competitive funds were 
expanded. Because the funds for joint research undertaken with the private sector 
constitute an important source of income for universities, there was a shift in their 
identity as corporations significantly increased the incentive for universities to engage 
in UICs. In addition, incorporation made it possible for universities to own intellectual 
property as an organization. The 2002 Outline of Intellectual Property Strategy spelled 
out a principle whereby the title to inventions devised by university employees was 
vested in the university as a corporation, rather than in the individual inventor. From FY 
2003, MEXT promoted the establishment of “Programs for the Establishment of 
University Intellectual Property Offices” to support intellectual property activities in 
universities, and the operational framework for and management of intellectual property 
in universities were put in place; principally at 34 universities whose programs were 
accepted in the MEXT's solicitation of bids. 
As described above, the series of UIC promotion policies devised a method for 
establishing university ownership of university research results and transferring the 
resulting technologies to the private sector through licensing agreements with 
corporations. It has become a common practice for companies and universities to co-
own the results of joint research as specified by contractual agreements. This 
arrangement transformed the nature of UICs from informal relationships between 
companies and individual researchers (that is, results of joint research would be owned 
by the company as intellectual property, while the academic researcher would be 




on a contractual basis, with the university patent office serving as the intermediary. 
Opinions regarding the appropriateness of this policy shift are divided. Critics indicated 
the following issues with the traditional informal method (Kneller, 2003). 
  Because the format of the technology transfers was not accompanied by well-
defined contracts between companies and universities, companies had a weak 
incentive to develop the transferred technologies to the point of commercialization. 
  The transfer of intellectual property rights through informal technology transfers 
made it difficult for university spin-out firms to launch commercial operations 
based on the research results. 
  Because the research results obtained in state-subsidized projects are vested in the 
state, they are not readily commercialized even for joint research. 
While the enactment of the Japanese Bayh–Dole Act resolved the last issue, the items 
listed suggest that joint research in a framework of ambiguous contractual relationships 
can lead to significant delay on the part of companies at the time of commercialization. 
On the other hand, research results under the informal UIC method depended on 
relationships of trust between university and corporate researchers (Zucker and Darby, 
2001). With more direct involvement of universities, previously smooth cooperative 
relationships occasionally became awkward. For instance, when the results of joint 
research are jointly owned as intellectual property, the university typically demands that 
the company pay certain non-licensing fees (or an equivalent monetary compensation in 
place of licensing fees, should the company choose not to license the intellectual 
property in question). The company is also compelled to obtain consent from the 




university is thus capable of halting progress regarding the practical application of 
research results by simply asserting its rights. Given the significant asymmetry of 
information between businesses and universities in UICs, a clear and proximate 
communication is essential. This is one reason why cases of collaboration between 
partners in geographical proximity are so common (Abramo et al., 2010). However, 
some believe that if considerable emphasis is placed on the contractual relationship, 
useful results will become less likely. Others believe that we are in a period of transition 
from the informal method to the contractual method and that the coexistence of the two 
systems understandably raises issues (Takata, 2009). Although the number of joint 
university–industry projects has increased with progress in UICs, the average size of 
such projects remains unchanged, at around 2.5 million yen. Takata claims that the sum 
is small because of the informal nature of the current relationships, and those companies 
are yet to work out how to best position a big budget, contractual approach to university 
collaborations. 
3.  Literature surveys 
Numerous empirical studies have examined the nature of UICs. Here we survey studies 
that focus on how UIC policies have affected the nature of research in universities, the 
topic of this study.
 1 The enactment of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980 in the US sharply 
increased the number of patents held by universities, and several studies have analyzed 
the nature of these patents. The Bayh–Dole Act was based on certain assumptions, 
including the idea that valuable technologies generated by universities were left 
untapped, and converting such discoveries into intellectual property licensed by 
universities to the commercial sector would contribute to the industry. While the 
enactment of the measures did increase the number of university patents, the quality of 
                                                  




these patents is less certain. 
Using 19,535 university patents registered with the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark 
Office) during the period 1965–1992 and a random sample of 1% of the patents 
registered with the USPTO during the same period (40,859 patents), Henderson et al. 
(1998) evaluated changes in the quality of university patents by examining changes in 
importance and generality, as measured by forward citations. University patents 
generally exhibited higher scores for importance and generality than ordinary patents. 
However, such differences existed at a statistically significant level only until around 
1982. Neither indicator exhibited statistically significant differences thereafter, 
indicating that while the number of university patents had increased sharply, their 
importance and generality declined in relative terms. While possible explanations 
include the entry of universities lacking patent experience or a general decline in the 
quality of research, the research by Henderson et al. concludes that the Bayh–Dole Act 
and other policies strengthening the patent-filing incentives for universities also 
encouraged efforts to seek legal standing for low-quality patents. 
Advancing a counterargument, Sampat et al. (2003) used the same sample as Henderson 
et al. (1998), but expanded the estimate beyond 1992 to include citation data through 
1999. They observed no decline in the importance indicator and argued that the result 
obtained by Henderson et al. reflected a truncation problem in the citation data. 
Characteristically, university patents tend to have a longer citation lag compared to 
company patents, so the data must be obtained over an extended period to clearly assess 
the number of citations.
2 
                                                  
2 While some studies argue that the significance of citations differs depending on when the citation was 
made, opinions are divided as to which ones are more significant. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), 
among others, maintain that early citations are more valuable, whereas Hall et al., (2005), among others, 




In a reassessment, Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) classified the estimates by Henderson 
et al. (1998) into three groups: (1) universities that had applied for patents before the 
Bayh–Dole Act was enacted and held ten or more patents; (2) universities that had 
applied for patents before the Bayh–Dole Act was enacted but held fewer than ten 
patents; and (3) universities that had applied for patents only after the enactment of the 
Bayh–Dole Act. Demonstrating that the value of the patents declined only in categories 
(2) and (3), and not in (1), they argued that despite the apparent decline in the overall 
quality of university patents following the influx of universities lacking patent 
application experience following the Bayh–Dole Act, the quality of patents by top 
universities did not decline. Despite the spike in the number of university patents 
following the Bayh–Dole Act, these numbers declined after a peak around 2000, 
prompting some observers to argue that the importance of university patents may have 
declined (Leydesdorff and Meyer, 2010).  
Did the Bayh–Dole Act affect the nature of university research? Did greater incentives 
to commercialize research results lead to neglect in basic research, the natural domain of 
universities and most companies’ area of weakness? Rosell and Agrawal (2009) 
examined changes in the concentration of citations of university inventions, considering 
the signs of reduction in the flow of patented university knowledge. They observed that 
the citations of university patents showed statistically significant lower levels of 
concentration than those of corporate patents, a difference that disappeared from 1983 
onward. While suggesting a reduction in the flow of university-generated knowledge, 
this tendency was particularly pronounced in the pharmaceutical and bio fields. No 
major differences were observed in other disciplines. On the other hand, based on the 
results of a questionnaire survey, Thursby and Thursby (2002) argued that universities 




commercialization of their technologies. 
This US model for UIC has not only spread to Japan but also to Europe. Mowery and 
Sampat (2005) argued for the limited impact of the Bayh–Dole Act on university patents 
in the US, pointing out that patent applications filed by universities in the US had been 
already increasing before its enactment. Regarding the potential spread to other 
countries, they argued that US universities have traditionally enjoyed close relationships 
with non-government-owned organizations and the private sector. Adopting such 
policies in other countries that lack such environment might result in limited impact. 
They went on to argue that despite the adoption of policies inspired by the Bayh–Dole 
Act in OECD countries (Denmark, Germany, France, Canada, Japan), implementing 
such policies based on the US model tends to ignore the central premise of the Bayh–
Dole Act, the transfer of publicly-funded research results from the state to universities, 
while focusing instead on “vesting inventions by university researchers in the 
universities.” 
Goldfarb and Henrekson (2005) compared the policies on commercializing university 
intellectual property adopted by the US and Sweden, countries that budget comparably 
higher for university R&D but use different models to commercialize research results. 
Analyzing the mechanisms for the technology transfer of university intellectual property, 
they argued that Sweden failed to commercialize university intellectual property 
because of ineffective incentive structures in universities. Although the transfer of 
technology from universities requires the active involvement of university inventors, the 
transfer of technology in and of itself does not constitute academic achievement. 
Although the US model through the Bayh–Dole Act and other means provides 
universities with incentives to address commercial opportunities, it usually adopts a 




through trial and error. They also argue that ownership of intellectual property rights by 
universities, rather than by inventors, provides inventors with incentives to 
commercialize technologies and that university TLOs provide effective support for 
patenting and intellectual property licensing activities. In the Swedish model, they 
argued that the government establishes intellectual property policies on behalf of the 
universities and leaves them with little autonomy, as in other European countries. 
Because the US model is premised on competition among university faculty and among 
universities, they effectiveness of Swedish approach, simply expands the rights of 
universities without changing whole university system, is questionable.  
These studies focus on the different ways in which universities operate in the US, 
Europe, and Japan, as well as on their respective institutional aspects. They do not apply 
systematic analyses based on patent data, as in the case of the studies conducted in the 
US by Henderson et al. (1998) and Sampat et al. (2003). Tamada and Inoue (2007) 
investigated changes in the number of joint patent applications filed by universities or 
public research organizations and by the private sector, and demonstrated that UIC 
patents increased in number consistently after 1972 and accelerated in the late 1990s. 
Kanama and Okuwada (2008) performed a detailed analysis of university patent 
applications filed by Tsukuba University, Hiroshima University, and Tohoku University. 
Despite differences in the scale and area of focus with regard to intellectual property 
activities at the three universities, the authors noted a common phenomena; increase in 
the number of joint applications and decrease in the number of corporate patent 
applications naming university researchers as inventors. 
Baba and Goto (2007) summarized the changes that occurred in universities with regard 
to UIC activities. Using a questionnaire survey of Tokyo University’s engineering and 




402), they examined how institutional reforms intended to promote UICs affected those 
collaborations that occurred during the five-year period of 1998–2003,while the reforms 
were occurring. Investigating whether university researchers engaged in joint research 
with researchers from other organizations, they showed that in 2003, university 
researchers often cooperated with researchers from other universities (85%) and 
researchers from large domestic firms (79%), and that relationships with small- and 
mid-sized enterprises (SMEs) increased notably following changes in the system (30%-
51%). With regard to the activities that lead to commercialization and pursued by 
academicians in cooperation with companies, they showed that at least 60% researchers 
had filed at least one patent application, while 20% or more had executed a license 
agreement. Another finding was the continuing and widespread practice of traditional 
informal collaboration. Comparing top researchers (defined as those in the top 10% of 
the researchers covered by the study in terms of the average number of annual research 
publications in the preceding ten years) with other researchers, the authors observed that 
the former were more actively involved in commercialization. Overall, the study argued 
that at the level of the individual researcher, academic research and UICs are not 
necessarily bound in a trade-off relationship. 
To analyze patents associated with UICs in Japan and Europe, we must trace inventor 
information, rather than simply examining joint applications. Until the introduction of 
the US-style contract model, patents resulting from UICs were often filed by companies 
alone. These cases can be identified as UICs because the academic inventors involved 
are named among the inventors. Lissioni et al. (2008) identified academic inventors 
named in patent data for Italy, France, Sweden, and Denmark, indicating that examining 
joint application data alone underestimates the role played by the universities in 




approach to identify university inventors in Japanese patent data, our study closely 
evaluates the UIC policies’ effects on university research since their introduction in the 
late 1990s. 
4.  Data and underlining hypotheses 
Using Japanese patent data, we quantitatively assessed how the technological value and 
the results of UICs changed in nature following the implementation of UIC policies in 
the late 1990s. Like Henderson et al. (1998) and Sampat et al. (2003), among others, we 
examine the changes brought about by UIC policies in patent characteristics.  
The patent data used in this study was extracted from the IIP Patent Database, a 
database published for research use and based on the Seiri Hyojunka Data (organized 
and standardized data) released by the Japan Patent Office (Goto and Motohashi, 2007). 
The data in the IIP Patent Database is generally updated once a year. We use the 
database version containing the data released in September 2009. 
When dealing with patents as the outcome of UICs, one must examine corporate patents 
that involved university personnel (known as jointly-invented university–industry 
patents) by tracing inventor information, as well as the patents for which applications 
were filed jointly by industry and academia (known as joint-application university–
industry patents). Postal address information is used to identify inventor attributes. 
Corporate inventors often use company addresses, such that it is relatively easy to 
determine their attributes. In contrast, university researchers tend to give personal 
residential addresses,  particularly in cases where national universities are involved 
before incorporation, thereby making identification more difficult. Inventors giving 
personal residential addresses are individual inventors, corporate inventors, or inventors 




inventors at public research organizations are less likely to give personal residential 
addresses, while individual inventors generally name themselves as applicants. 
Therefore, a patent, applied by a corporate and co-authored by inventors with corporate 
address and ones with personal residential addresses, is likely to be a joint inventions 
university-industry patent. Certainly, this is only a rule of thumb. Close investigation of 
data identifies certain corporate patents in which the inventor is not affiliated with the 
corporation. In this study, we extract joint invented patents by minimizing errors 
associated with the rule of thum above, by using the information of the share of joint 
application university and industry patents by company and application year. The 
methodology for extracting jointly invented university–industry patents is detailed in 
the appendix.  
Figure 1 shows changes in the number of extracted UIC patents. The number of patent 
applications filed jointly by universities and companies increased, whereas the number 
of jointly-invented patents decreased after 2003. This is due to the incorporation of 
national universities in 2004, when national universities started to claim joint-applicant 
status, and when informal UICs were being supplanted by formal arrangements. Despite 
changes in patent applications, the overall number of UIC patents increased. 
 (Figure 1) 
This study focuses on the effects of UIC policies around 2000, so that we use only 
patents applied in or after 1990. We extracted a total of 87,927 patents, consisting of 
72,050 joint university–industry inventions and 15,877 joint university–industry 
applications. We performed our assessments using a “difference in difference” model: 
that is, we compared the characteristics of these patents, as expressed in relative patent 




research by companies without university collaboration, called unassisted corporate 
patent, hereafter―before and after the introduction of UIC policies. Moreover, for each 
UIC patent, we randomly extracted unassisted corporate patents belonging to the same 
IPC sub-classification and year of application, using these patents as a control group. 
Using patents of the same technology classification and year of application allows us to 
avoid the differences attributable to the technological classification of patent-citing data 
and data truncation biases. 
We used the following six indicators to evaluate patent value and characteristics: 
  Number of claims 
  Number of inventors 
  Number of forward citations (further classified into the number of forward self-
citations and the number of forward non-self citations) 
  Generality index 
The number of claims refers to the number of claims contained in one patent; this figure 
may be regarded as the volume of technologies to which the patent claims rights. In 
1988, Japan introduced a revised multiple claims system, which caused the number of 
claims per patent to increase gradually. By using control groups consisting of patents for 
which applications were filed in the same year, we avoid biases resulting from changes 
in the system. The number of inventors refers to the number of inventors named in one 
patent. In corporate patents, this refers to the number of individuals participating in the 
project related to the patent, indicating the significance of the project. It is worth noting 
that in the case of university patents, some argue that major patents tend to be associated 




cited in numerous subsequent patents is regarded as having had a more significant 
technological impact. Thus, many studies use the number of forward citations as an 
indicator of a patent’s technological value (Trajtenberg, 1990; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 1994; Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Our study uses the number of forward 
citations as an index of a patent’s technological value, further classifying this number 
into the number of forward self-citations and the number of forward non-self citations in 
order to determine the parties impacted by the technology. Where Patent A is cited by 
Patent B, and the applicants for Patents A and B are identical, the citation is a forward 
self citation. The citation is a forward non-self citation if the applicants are different. 
Where the number of forward self-citations is large, we may assume that the patent is 
valuable, particularly for the applicant, and that in the case of a company, the 
technology most likely involves a field that is closely related to the company’s 
commercial or R&D domains. In contrast, if the number of forward non-self citations is 
large, the patent is more likely to be a general-purpose technology that also happens to 
hold value for companies and entities other than the applicant. Generality indicates the 
breadth of fields in which the patent is cited: the higher the value, the more general and 
fundamental the technology (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the six indicators for each patent pair extracted 
above. While all patent indicators used in this analysis are calculated on a patent-by-
patent basis, the number of forward self-citations and forward non-self citations are 
calculated on a patent-by-patent-and-applicant-by-applicant basis. We create these 
indicators by simply summing the citation combinations on both the citing side and the 
cited side, rather than by partial counting; that is, by allocating the number of citations 
proportionally on the basis of the number of applicants. The figures for forward 




There are many missing values when the number of forward citations is zero because 
generality cannot be calculated in such cases. The technology classification used to 
calculate generality here comprises the 33 groups used in the IIP patent data (Goto and 
Motohashi, 2005). The mean values in Table 2 indicate that UIC patents have higher 
values than unassisted corporate patents for the number of inventors, the number of 
forward citations, and generality, while showing lower values for the numbers of claims 
and forward self-citations. In short, UIC patents tend to be more for general-purpose, 
with wider spillover effects than unassisted corporate patents. 
 (Table 2) 
In our analyses based on this data, we establish three broad hypotheses. First, we expect 
UIC patents to have higher technological value than unassisted corporate patents, as 
measured by the number of forward citation patents, because UIC patents constitute the 
results of research tapping a broader knowledge base through collaboration with 
universities. From a company’s perspective, R&D in core technology areas tends to be 
conducted in-house, whereas R&D conducted in collaboration with universities and 
other external parties tends to focus on areas that expand the company’s technological 
frontiers by involving new technologies (Motohashi, 2008). UIC patents are supposed to 
have wider spillover effects that extend beyond the involved companies compared to 
corporate patents. Furthermore, universities engage in basic research, which tends to 
lead to broader applications for the resulting technologies. In light of these findings, we 
would expect UIC patents to be more fundamentally valuable (have greater applicability 
and potential for future research) than unassisted corporate patents. We would also 
expect that increased incentive to commercialize university technologies resulting from 
UIC policies in the late 1990’s would weaken the strengths of UIC patents. These 




H. 1-1 UIC patents have greater technological value than unassisted corporate patents. 
H. 1-2 UIC patents have far-reaching spillover effects extending beyond the companies 
that invented them. 
H. 1-3 UIC patents tend to be more fundamentally valuable.  
H. 1-4 These trends have weakened since 2000, when UIC policies were implemented. 
The next hypothesis is based on the supposition that the purpose and outcome of UICs 
vary depending on the size of the company, among other factors. Motohashi (2005) 
argued that the objective of UICs for SMEs, which have limited in-house R&D 
resources, is to acquire technologies that can be readily incorporated into their product 
development. In contrast, large companies seek basic/fundamental technologies based 
on long-term innovation strategies. Motohashi showed SMEs experience larger 
productivity gains than large companies, reflecting the different focus of each group's 
R&D activities. However, given the more rigorous management of intellectual property 
by universities and more contracts governing joint research, particularly with the 
incorporation of national universities, we may assume that companies have shifted their 
joint research from fundamental areas to more practical areas involving product 
development. In contrast to the focus on more wide-ranging joint basic research of 
previous years, this shift has made more efficient use of UICs and can be seen more in 
smaller firms; we can see that UIC activities have intensified after the late 1990s, 
particularly for SMEs (Baba and Goto, 2007; Motohashi, 2005). These UIC activities 
are summarized as follows: 
H. 2-1 UICs in small firms have more application orientation, while those in large firms 




H. 2-2 After 2000, the contents of UICs shifted toward application orientation, and this 
shift can be found more in SMEs, as compared to large firms.  
Lastly, with the introduction of a UIC system based on a contractual method modeled 
on that in the US, what would previously have been filed by companies alone as joint 
university–industry invention patents are now filed jointly. Analyzing the differences in 
the filing pattern is also helpful in evaluating the US model. From a company’s 
perspective, joint ownership of rights through joint patent application indicates that the 
company must obtain the university’s consent to apply for patent through licensing 
agreements. Thus, we would expect companies to have a strong incentive to undertake 
R&D in areas important to their own in-house needs, rather than to collaborate with 
universities. We would expect joint-application university–industry patents to generally 
score lower on the value indicator than jointly-invented university–industry patents 
generated by informal UICs. 
H. 3-1 The patent value indicator is higher for jointly-invented university–industry 
patents than for jointly-applied university–industry patents. 
H. 3-2 Jointly-invented university–industry patents are more actively used in-house than 
jointly-applied university–industry patents. 
5.  Results  
It is well known that a patent quality indicator such as the number of forward citations 
has skewed distribution, and we cannot assume normal distribution for testing 
hypotheses in the previous section. We have checked the normality of distribution of our 
variables by the Skewness and Kurtosis (S–K) test and determined that the normality 




the following statistical analysis.  
Table 3 shows the mean differences of our variables between UIC patents and matched 
patents by a single corporate applicant, and the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
UIC patents have higher statistically significant values than those filed by single 
corporate applicants for the number of inventors, the number of forward citations, and 
the number of forward non-self citations. It should be noted that the number of claims 
have different signs for the mean difference and Wilcoxon test result, where negative 
mean claims may be explained by outliers. In contrast, UIC patents have statistically 
significant lower values for forward self-citations. The number of forward citations, the 
most widely used indicator of technological value, has higher statistically significant 
values for UIC patents, indicating higher technological value. In comparison to patents 
filed by corporate applicants alone, these patents have lower number of forward self-
citations and higher number of forward non-self citations, indicating far-reaching 
spillover effects on companies other than those participating in the collaboration, 
thereby supporting hypotheses H. 1-1 and H. 1-3. With regard to generality, which 
measures the reach of a patent’s technological application, UIC patents have statistically 
higher values than those filed by single corporate applicants for patent applications filed 
through 1999. However, no statistically significant differences were observed for patent 
applications filed since 2000. Thus, while hypothesis H. 1-2 holds for the entire time 
period, the trend has weakened. In contrast, UIC patents are consistently superior for the 
other indicators (particularly the indicator for the number of forward citation patents) 
both before and after 2000. Hence, we find no support here for hypothesis H.1-4. While 
UIC policies have strengthened incentives for universities to commercialize 
technologies, no decline in the quality of their achievements has been observed. Given 




research have contributed significantly toward corporate innovation and resulted in 
significant positive effects. 
 (Table 3) 
For the second hypothesis, we defined corporate applicants who are associated with a 
total of 100 or more patents filed during the entire period as “large-scale businesses.” 
All other businesses are classified as “small-scale businesses.” We compared the patent 
indicators for each group as the results of UICs (Table 4). In order to evaluate the 
second hypothesis, we first construct the following indicator d for all patent pairs.  
d = (patent value indicator of UIC patents)－(patent value indicator of patents filed by 
single corporate applicants) 
We then compared the value of d between the samples for small and large firms. The 
first column of Table 4 shows the mean differences (in difference value ds) between 
small and large firms (mean of small firms − mean of large firms). The second column 
shows the result of the Mann–Whitney U-test, which is the signed rank test used to 
compare two groups (small and large firms). 
(Table 4) 
We observe that UIC patents filed by small firms have less number of claims, fewer 
forward citations, and fewer forward self citations than those filed by large firms; an 
opposite pattern is observed in the number of inventors and forward non-self citations 
for all the periods covered. This finding contradicts H 2-1, in the sense that UIC patents 
filed by small firms have greater spillover effects on others, while those filed by larger 
firms tend to contribute more to their own innovative activities. There is significant 




as university spin-outs may explain higher forward-non-self citations for smaller firms. 
When we compared the results before and after 2000, the positive difference for small 
firms in terms of non-self citations disappeared, and the total number of forward 
citations for small firms became negative after 2000. This finding suggests that UIC 
patents filed by small firms become application-oriented faster than those filed by large 
firms. Hence H2-2 is supported.  
Finally, Table 5 shows the results from analyzing the differences in patent indicators 
between jointly-invented university–industry patents and joint-application university–
industry patents. The same methodology is used to compare small and large firms. Mean 
differences (in difference value ds) between joint inventions patents and joint 
application patents (joint invention group − joint application group) are presented in the 
first column, and the Mann-Whitney U-test results for the two groups are described in 
the second column. 
(Table 5) 
It was observed that joint inventions had statistically significant higher values than joint 
applications in terms of the number of inventors and all forward citation indicators. In 
other words, jointly invented university–industry patents express a greater premium 
attributable to UICs than joint-application university–industry patents, a result 
supporting hypothesis H. 3-1. Table 5 shows that joint inventions also have higher 
statistically significant values in terms of forward self-citations for all sample groups, 
indicating that jointly invented university–industry patents have a more significant 
impact on the companies involved. In other words, many patents with significant 
implications for corporate product development were filed as joint inventions and not 




6. Discussion and policy implications 
Using patent data, this study analyzes how the results of UICs differ from that of R&D 
conducted by businesses alone, and how the contractual UIC system, modeled on that of 
the US introduced in the late 1990s, have affected these collaboration results. We 
defined and extracted UIC patents as both joint applications and joint inventions, and 
observed that UIC patents proved more valuable than patents filed by single corporate 
applicants in a statistically significant manner, even after considering the year of 
application and the field of technology by pairing UIC patents with patents filed by 
single corporate applicants from the same year of application and IPC classification. 
UIC patents, in particular, are associated with more forward non-self citations and fewer 
forward self-citations than patents filed by single corporate applicants, indicating wide-
ranging spillover effects going beyond the companies involved. We also found that UIC 
patents were associated with higher statistically significant scores than patents filed by 
single corporate applicants with respect to generality, a measure of technology’s 
fundamental nature. The higher scores also reflect the continuing fundamental nature 
and generality of university research. With respect to the impact of the US-style UIC 
policies, UIC patents lost their superiority in the generality indicator from 2000 onward, 
but their technological value, as measured by the number of forward citations, remains 
unchanged. The number of university patent applications and UIC patent applications 
increased sharply in the early 2000s, which according to our estimation, has not resulted 
in decline in the overall quality. Following the adoption of UIC policies from the second 
half of the 1990s, the results of scientific research at universities and other dominant 
recipients of public R&D funds began to contribute more toward corporate innovation. 
While observing the value of UIC patents based on the scale of operations of the 




their UICs than large-scale businesses. The generality index of patents for smaller firms’ 
UIC patents indicates relatively greater value than that of large firms. It can be 
interpreted that a significant number of high-tech start-ups, typically university spinoffs, 
explain our results of higher non-self-citations for UIC patents by smaller firms. In 
addition, the shift to application orientation after UIC policy reforms in the late 1990s is 
more noticeable in small firms, because the population of small firms with UIC 
activities is expanded to include SMEs with regular business activities (Baba and Goto, 
2007; Motohashi, 2005). 
Finally, comparing jointly invented university–industry patents and joint-application 
university–industry patents, we found that the former had greater value regardless of 
company size, as measured by the number of forward citations. Similarly, jointly-
invented university–industry patents exhibit higher statistically significant values for 
forward self-citations and forward non-self citations than joint-application university–
industry patents. From company’s viewpoint, jointly invented patents are solely owned 
by the company, while patent right for joint applied patents are shared with university. 
Therefore, firm’s incentive for collaborative research with university may be smaller 
when its expected results are supposed to be filed as jointly application patents. In 
addition, a license fee to the university will be incurred when those results are used by 
the company. This may be the reason why jointly invented university–industry patents, 
which are more readily applicable to products being developed, have proven more 
commercially valuable than joint-application university–industry patents.  
Based on the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that the US-style contractual UIC 
system introduced in the late 1990s has helped the research results at universities, often 
financed by tax money, to contribute to development of economy and society as a whole.  




participation by SMEs carries great value. However, the difference between the value of 
jointly invented university–industry patents and the value of joint-application 
university–industry patents raises questions about the recent pro-UIC policies, which 
have focused on strengthening the management of intellectual property by universities. 
Informal collaborations between universities and businesses have occurred in Japan in 
the past, as discussed in Section 2, and the resulting jointly invented university–industry 
patents have produced significant value as well. Strengthening the management of 
intellectual properties by universities via recent pro-UIC policy measures may have, to 
some degree, transformed universities into commercial entities, while hindering the 
original purpose: facilitating the transfer of research results to the private sector. 
University research results generated by publicly funded efforts should be returned to 
the society at large in the appropriate manner. For these reasons, it may be worth 
reconsidering a uniform policy—like the one currently in place—that encourages joint 
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Table 1: Evolution of Japan’s UIC policy 
1998  Formulation of the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer from 
Universities to Private Industry (the TLO Act) 
→ Promoted the establishment of TLOs (Technology Licensing 
Organizations) 
Amendment of the Law for Facilitating Governmental Research Exchange 
→ Made it possible to use government-owned land at low cost for joint 
university–industry research  
1999  Creation of the Small Business Innovation Research Program (“Japanese 
SBIR”) 
Formulation of the Act on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization 
→ Japanese version of the Bayh–Dole Act/licensing fee halved for approved 
TLOs 
Establishment of the Japan Accreditation Board for Engineering Education 
(JABEE) 
2000  Formulation of the Industrial Technology Enhancement Act → Enabled 
gratis use of national university facilities by approved/certified TLOs, 
allowed university researchers to serve concurrently as TLO directors, board 
directors of companies commercializing research results, and statutory 
auditors of stock corporations 
2001  “Hiranuma Plan” announced “Plan for 1,000 university-originated ventures 
in three years” 
2002  Revision of the Ministry of Finance Property Administration Bureau 
Notification No. 1 → Allowed university-originated ventures to use national 
university facilities 
Revision of the TLO Law Notification → Made it easier for businesses to 
start approved TLOs 
2003  Formulation of the Intellectual Property Basic Act → Obligated universities 
to voluntarily and actively seek to develop human resources, research 




Amendment of the School Education Law → Created special emphasis 
graduate school systems, increased flexibility in establishing university 
faculties/departments 
2004  Implementation of the National University Corporation Law → Status of 
university researchers: “non-civil servant type,” capital contributions to 
approved TLOs 
Implementation of the Act for Partial Revision of the Patent Act → revision 
of patent-related charges relating to universities and TLOs. 



























































































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
UIC patents Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Numbers of claims 114566 5.669 7.391 1 286
Number of inventors 117218 3.890 1.790 1 22
Number of forward citations 117218 1.395 2.940 0 115
   Number of forward self-citations 162303 0.191 1.040 0 107
　Number of forward nonself-citations 162303 1.234 2.508 0 74
Generality index 50761 0.221 0.317 0 1
Matching firm patents Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Numbers of claims 115070 6.016 9.611 1 999
Number of inventors 116514 2.339 1.571 1 38
Number of forward citations 117218 1.194 2.570 0 123
   Number of forward self-citations 162303 0.198 0.860 0 50
　Number of forward nonself-citations 162303 1.011 2.248 0 85













Overall sample   (obs=162303)
Numbers of claims -0.321 +++
Number of inventors 1.553 +++
Number of forward citations 0.201 +++
  Number of forward self-citations -0.007 ---
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.223 +++
Generality index 0.021 +++
application year ~1999 (obs=102489)
Numbers of claims -0.030 +++
Number of inventors 1.622 +++
Number of forward citations 0.240 +++
  Number of forward self-citations -0.032 ---
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.293 +++
Generality index 0.022 +++
applied after 2000 (obs=59814)
Numbers of claims -0.825
Number of inventors 1.446 +++
Number of forward citations 0.142 +++
  Number of forward self-citations 0.037 ++
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.103 +++
Generality index 0.009
Note: 
+: UIC>matched, +++: 1% level, ++: 5% level, +: 1% level statistically significant














Numbers of claims 0.192 --
Number of inventors 0.108 +++
Number of forward citations -0.079 ---
  Number of forward self-citations -0.131 ---
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.052 ++
Generality index 0.004
application year ~1999  
Numbers of claims 0.354 +++
Number of inventors 0.225 +++
Number of forward citations 0.000
  Number of forward self-citations -0.170 ---
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.170 +++
Generality index 0.011
applied after 2000  
Numbers of claims 0.289 --
Number of inventors 0.073 +++
Number of forward citations -0.128 ---
  Number of forward self-citations -0.117 ---
  Number of forward nonself-citations -0.012
Generality index -0.038
Note: 
+: small>large, +++: 1% level, ++: 5% level, +: 1% level statistically significant
-: small<large, ---: 1% level, --: 5% level, -: 1% level statistically significant  
 









Numbers of claims 0.332
Number of inventors 0.185 +++
Number of forward citations 0.204 +++
  Number of forward self-citations 0.010 ++
  Number of forward nonself-citations 0.204 +++
Generality index 0.027
Note: 
+: inv>apply, +++: 1% level, ++: 5% level, +: 1% level statistically significant




Appendix: Method for extracting UIC patents 
How should jointly invented university–industry patents be identified in any study 
analyzing UIC patents and corporate performance based on patent information? Since 
every patent can potentially fall within the scope addressed by such a study, it is 
impractical to identify inventor attributes via the Internet or other such means. We 
consider ways to mechanically identify jointly invented university–industry patents on 
the basis of inventor information found in patents. As mentioned above, we may assume 
that a patent is a jointly invented university–industry patent if its application filed by a 
corporation mentions both corporate researchers and a researcher with a personal 
address as inventors. At a certain point in time, some companies have revised their 
policies regarding addresses, giving the company’s address instead of a personal address 
for reasons of privacy and other considerations. This implies that depending on the year 
of application, even patents filed by the same company can exhibit different patterns of 
inventor attributes. Furthermore, the proportion of companies citing just a personal 
address for inventor information when the patent has been filed by a single corporate 
applicant has rapidly declined. Thus, assuming that all patents with both a corporate 
address and a personal address are UIC patents would overstate the growth in the 
proportion accounted for by UIC patents. 
In the case of patents filed by single corporate applicants, we eliminate from the scope 
of this analysis data believed to have a large bias (assuming that “patents having both a 
personal address and a corporate address” are jointly invented university–industry 
patents) by using for each applicant/year of application sample either “the proportion of 
patents with just a personal address” or “the proportion of patents with just a corporate 
address.” In other words, we screen each applicant/year of application sample for cases 




corporate address. To do this, we determined which criteria to apply and what 
percentage level is “too many” or “too few.” We examined the screening criteria, using 
the correlation with the proportion of patents determined to be joint inventions of 
corporate inventors and public university inventors (i.e., patents that are clearly jointly 
invented university–industry patents). We gathered patents filed by single corporate 
applicants by applicant and year of application, tallied the number of applications 
corresponding to the six types of patents given below, and presented the correlation 
coefficients for the share of each type in Supplementary Table A. Since the share data 
appears to have large errors in the case of applicants with very small numbers of 
applications, we presented the results for applicant/year of application samples with 10 
or more (10+) applications, and applicant/year of application samples with 100 or more 
(100+) applications. 
(1) patents associated with just a personal address 
(2) patents associated with just a corporate address 
(3) patents with public university address only 
(4) patents with both personal and corporate addresses 
(5) patents with both corporate and public university addresses 
(6) other patents 
The key point here is the correlation between patents corresponding to (4) and (5) above. 
In the case of applicant/year of application, we found a low but positive statistically 
significant correlation coefficient at the 1% level (0.050) for samples with more than 10 




100 applications, the correlation coefficient was somewhat higher (0.063), and the 
likelihood of accurately identifying joint university–industry inventions using patents 
corresponding to (4) became greater. 
 (Annex Table A) 
We then screened each applicant/year of application sample using either the “proportion 
of patents associated with just a personal address” or the “proportion of patents 
associated with just a corporate address” to examine how the relationship between the 
two changed. In particular, we performed the following regression analysis for different 
samples while adjusting these thresholds and comparing their coefficients (α). 
Share of corporate & public university patents = α (share of individual ＆ corporate 
patents)＋β 
 
Supplemental Charts A and B show how α changes with changes in the thresholds in 
“proportion of patents associated with just a personal address” and “proportion of 
patents associated with just a corporate address.” Ideally, α approaches 1; actual values 
are significantly below this, due to measurement errors. We determined that a higher α 
corresponded to a better fit of the above model (i.e., higher validity for interpreting the 
share of individual and corporate patents to be the proportion of jointly invented 
university–industry patents). Supplemental Charts A and B show the results of estimates 
that used only samples having more than 10 applications and the results of the estimates 
that used only samples having more than 100 applications. For samples screened using 
“proportion of patents associated with just a corporate address,” we observed that 




samples having a low proportion of patents associated with just a corporate address. For 
example, for samples with more than 10 patent applications, the coefficient rises from 
0.014 “without constraints” to 0.018 when we eliminate samples having a fewer than 
10% proportion of corporate-address-only patents. This proportion increases as we 
strengthen the control. At 50%, the coefficient reaches its highest point. In the case of 
companies with relatively large numbers of patent applications, this implies that the 
proportion of “individual and corporate addresses” patents can be used as an index of 
the proportion of jointly invented university–industry patents only for those years of 
application when the “proportion of patents associated with just a corporate address” is 
80% or above. In the case of samples with more than 100 applications, we did not 
observe patterns similar to the ones observed in samples with more than 10 applications. 
In addition, the size of the coefficient is generally lower for samples with more than 100 
applications. 
 (Annex Figure A), (Annex Figure B) 
Next, we consider the change in the coefficient with the “proportion of patents 
associated with just a personal address” as the threshold. In this case, the lower the 
threshold, the more rigorous the constraining condition with which we narrow the 
samples. Thus, we read the graph from the right end where there are “no constraints 
(100%).” The coefficient decreases as we apply stricter restrictions on the selected 100+ 
and 10+ samples.  
Based on the results of the foregoing test, in the case of applicant/year of application 
samples having more than 10 patent applications, we deemed the proportion of “patents 
with personal and corporate addresses” + the proportion of “patents with corporate and 




patents for samples in which corporate-address-only patents account for 50% or more. 
We treated the other data as missing values. We used “patents associated with just a 
corporate address” as the screening criterion because the coefficients obtained through 
regression analysis are generally higher than those for “patents associated with just a 
personal address.” In this analysis, we examined only patent applications filed by a 
single company. In reality, patents are occasionally filed jointly by multiple companies. 
Adjusting the threshold on the basis of company size (number of applications) 
complicates the handling of such joint-application patents.  
 









Firm only -0.7801* 1
University only -0.0133* -0.0198* 1
Ind+Univ -0.1337* -0.0713* 0.0007 1
Firm+Univ -0.0553* -0.0117* 0.0485* 0.0229* 1









Firm only -0.8061* 1
University only -0.0008 -0.0275* 1
Ind+Univ -0.0245* -0.0433* 0.0329* 1
Firm+Univ -0.0750* 0.0479* 0.2520* 0.0760* 1
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